I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative' the Supreme Court held that there is no medical exception to the Controlled Substances Act's ("CSA") 2 prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. Justice Thomas reasoned that because Congress unambiguously designated marijuana as a Schedule I substance within the CSA, it had determined that there was no current "accepted medical use" or medical benefit of marijuana to warrant an exception granted to other drugs under the Act.' Thus, due to what Thomas deemed to be "apparently absolute language" of the CSA, the Court summarily rejected the assertion of the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (the "Cooperative") that because a medical necessity defense exists under the common law, a medical necessity exception should be read into the CSA. 4 Lastly, the Court held that although lower federal courts do enjoy "sound discretion," this discretion does not allow federal courts to ignore Congress's judgment expressed within legislation. ' This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Oakland is inadequate because it fails to examine an issue necessary to resolve this case: does Congress's attempt to regulate the wholly intrastate activity of distribution of marijuana for medical purposes under the CSA exceed Congress's enumerated commerce power? First, the principles of federalism on which our government is based, in con-der medical supervision" are designated "Schedule I.23 Schedule I substances are strictly regulated, and the Act provides only one explicit exception in which use of Schedule I substances is permitted: government-approved research projects. 4 Physicians, therefore, cannot legally dispense Schedule I substances to any patient; however, physicians may lawfully distribute substances designated in Schedules II through V. 5 Congress placed marijuana, along with LSD and heroine, in Schedule I upon passage of the Act and it has remained in Schedule I to the present day. 6 Organizations such as the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML") and the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics ("ACT") have been trying to reschedule marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II for many years. 2 7 However, circumvent this process by legalizing marijuana, and other Schedule I drugs, for medicinal use without valid scientific evidence and the approval of the Food and Drug Administration." H.R.J. Res. 117, 105th Cong., 144 CONG. REC. H7719 (1998). Record of votes on the resolution appear at 144 CONG. REC. 1-17783 (1998) . See also Judy Holland, House Votes to factor test to reschedule marijuana. 6 In the mid-1970s, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") did establish an Individual Use Investigational New Drug ("IND") program, which gave a small number of patients access to marijuana on a limited and experimental basis. 3 7 However, in 1989, due to the drastic rise in AIDS, the FDA was bombarded with applications for the IND program. 3 " This led to the suspension and discontinuation of the program in 1991 and 1992, respectively, because, as the chief of the Public Health Service explained, the program undercut the federal government's opposition to the use of illegal drugs. 39 Only eight patients from the program continue to receive marijuana presently."
California Courts and Proposition 215
The California Court of Appeals for the First District has addressed Proposition 215 in two separate, disagreeing opinions. 41 First, in People v. Trippet 42 the Court held that Proposition 215 does not exempt a seriously ill patient and his primary caregiver from California's Health and Safety Code section 11360, which prohibits the transportation of marijuana. 43 However, the court held that Proposition 215 might provide a defense for a defendant charged with illegally transporting marijuana so long as "the quantity transported and the method, timing and distance of the transportation are reasonably related to the patient's current medical needs." 44 36 Id. (the factors were (1) scientific knowledge of the drug's chemistry, (2) its toxicology in animals, (3) established effectiveness treating humans in clinical trials, (4) availability of the substance and the facts about its effects, (5) documentation of uses in generally accepted medical reference materials, (6) specific indications for use, (7) acceptance by the community of medical professionals, and (8) acceptance and use by a substantial body of U.S. medical practitioners). 
Federal Case Law and Proposition 215
The federal government's opposition to Proposition 215 was first directed towards physicians in California who recommended medicinal use of marijuana pursuant to state law. 4 9 Specifically, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and General Barry McCaffrey, the Director of the National Drug Control Policy, threatened physicians with criminal prosecution, disqualification from Medicare and Medicaid programs, and revocation of DEA registration to prescribe controlled substances." A group of California physicians and their patients responded to the government with a class action lawsuit that directly challenged the constitutionality of the Clinton Administration's threat to prosecute California physicians who recommended the medical use of marijuana for their seriously ill patients. 1 
2002]

SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Amendment free speech rights to discuss marijuana. 2 The federal district court granted a preliminary injunction on the ground that the federal government threats may infringe upon the physicians' First Amendment rights. 3 However, the Court greatly limited its opinion by also holding that conversations between the physicians and patients were protected only to the extent that the physician did not aid and abet or conspire to violate the federal prohibition against marijuana. 4 On September 7, 2000, however, the district court permanently enjoined the federal government from threatening to revoke DEA prescription licenses from physicians who recommend marijuana to patients, holding that in light of the First Amendment the DEA had exceeded its authority. 55 The court held that while the federal government had a legitimate concern in enforcing marijuana prohibition, this concern "pale Since the passage of Proposition 215, several individuals have created non-profit "medical cannabis dispensaries" or "cooperatives" to provide marijuana for seriously ill patients upon a physician's recommendation. 7 To date, approximately twenty-five cannabis cooperatives have been established in California. 58 The organizers claim that prior to the creation of these dispensaries, qualified patients were forced to purchase marijuana, if they could at all, on the black market, paying excessive prices for questionable quality marijuana. 9 In these cooperatives, a physician serves as medical director, and registered nurses staff the organization during business hours. 6 become a member of a Cooperative, patients are required to provide a written statement from a treating physician agreeing to marijuana therapy, and the patient then must go through a screening interview. 6 If a patient is accepted, he receives an identification card that allows him to procure marijuana from the Cooperative. 62 In January of 1998, more than a year after California voters passed Proposition 215, the United States filed six separate lawsuits against six independent cannabis dispensaries and individuals involved with the dispensaries. 63 Pursuant to Local Rule 3-12, all six cases were reassigned to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California as related cases. 64 The United States alleged that the defendants violated federal law under the CSA whether or not the defendants' activities were legal under California law. Specifically, the federal government alleged that the defendants' manufacture and distribution of marijuana violated 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1); their use of facilities (the actual locations) for the purpose of manufacture and distribution violated 21 U.S.C. section 856(a)(1); and the individual defendants' conspiracy to violate the CSA violated 21 U.S.C. section 846.65 Thus, the United States sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Cooperative from distributing and manufacturing marijuana under 21 U.S.C. section 882(a), which provides federal district courts with jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the Act. 66 The Cooperative argued that the court should dismiss the federal government's claims because 21 U.S.C. section 841(a) exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 6 In Cannabis, the district court held that the Government established a probability that it would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that the defendants are in violation of federal law. 71 Thus, it granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from manufacturing or distributing marijuana, or from possessing marijuana with the intent to manufacture and distribute it. 72 First, the court held that it has jurisdiction to hear the case because the CSA does not exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 7 3 The court asserted that when Congress declares that an entire class of activities affects commerce, courts have no power to "'excise, as trivial individual instances' of the class. 74 The court pointed to Congress's detailed findings that intrastate cultivation, distribution and possession of controlled substances have "a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce." 75 The court also stressed that since Lopez was decided, the Ninth Circuit has held that Congress's enactment of the CSA is permissible under the Commerce Clause. 76 The court rejected the defendants' argument that distribution of marijuana to seriously ill patients is not within the class of activities that Congress sought to regulate with the CSA, arguing that even if such activity falls into a different class, that class also sub-68 514 U.S. 549 (1995 [Vol. 93 stantially affects interstate commerce. 77 The court decided that there is nothing about the nature of medical marijuana that limits it to intrastate cultivation or distribution. 7 " The court concluded that distribution, even "if done for the humanitarian purpose of service the legitimate health care needs of seriously ill patients," can affect interstate commerce.
79
Moving on to the merits of the case, the court then held that the Government established it would likely succeed in proving that the defendants' conduct violated federal law. First, the court asserted that it is immaterial whether the defendants' conduct falls within Proposition 215. It concluded that a state law which purports to legalize the distribution of marijuana for any purpose, "even a laudable one," nonetheless directly conflicts with federal law, specifically 21 U.S.C. section 841(a), which does not exempt the distribution of marijuana to seriously ill persons for their personal medical use. 81 Lastly, the court held that the joint users defense, the ultimate user defense, and, most importantly, the medical necessity defense would not preclude the granting of injunctive relief sought here. 82 The court explained that for the medical necessity defense to succeed, the defendants would have the difficult task of proving that each and every patient it provides marijuana to is in danger of imminent harm, the marijuana will alleviate that harm, and that each patient had no other alternatives. The district court concluded by asserting that it was not declaring Proposition 215 to be unconstitutional, and it was not enjoining possession of marijuana by seriously ill patients for medical use upon a physician's recommendation. 84 The court also made clear that it was not foreclosing the possibility of a medical necessity or constitutionality defense in any proceeding in which it is alleged that a defendant has violated the injunction the court issued in its opinion."
The Cooperative did not appeal the injunction, but violated it by I' Id. at 1098. 
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continuing to distribute marijuana to several persons. 86 The Government initiated contempt proceedings, in which the Cooperative defended that any distributions were medically necessary. 87 The district court rejected this defense, found the Cooperative in contempt, and, at the Government's request, modified the injunction to empower a United States Marshall to seize the Cooperative's premises. 8 A few days later, the district court summarily rejected a motion made by the Cooperative to modify the injunction to permit medically necessary distributions. 89
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (1999)("OCBC")
In response to the district court's decision, the Cooperative and its executive, Jeffrey Jones, (collectively, "the Cooperative") sought an interlocutory appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 9 " The appellants did not appeal the district court's order enjoining the distribution of marijuana, but sought to appeal three subsequent district court orders: (1) the order denying the Cooperative's motion to dismiss, (2) the order subsequently purged and vacated that found the Cooperative in contempt of the injunction, and (3) the order denying the Cooperative's motion to modify the injunction to permit cannabis distribution to persons who have a doctor's certificate that marijuana is a medical necessity. 91 Because the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the first two district court orders, it only ruled on the third, the district court's refusal to modify the injunction to include a medical necessity exception. 9 2 The court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to modify the injunction, and remanded for the district court to include in the injunction the criteria for the medical necessity exemp- 91 Id. 92 The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to dismiss because denial of the motion to dismiss is not one of the interlocutory orders that can be appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and it is not a final judgment under § 1291. It further held that it lacked jurisdiction over the contempt order appeal because the order was purged, rendering the issue moot. OCBC, 190 F.3d at 1111-12.
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tion 93 established in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Aguilar. 94 First, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had the discretion to modify the injunction. 95 The court asserted that the district court was mistaken in its belief that it did not have the power to issue an injunction more limited in scope than the CSA. 9 6 The court held that district courts have broad equitable discretion in deciding injunctions against violations of federal statutes unless Congress has balanced the equities and has explicitly mandated an injunction within the statute. 97 The court concluded that nothing in the CSA mandates a limitation on district courts' equitable discretion. 98 Thus, the court asserted that the district court was not being asked to ignore federal law as it claimed it was, but was instead being asked to simply take into account the "legally cognizable defense" of medical necessity that most likely would pertain to this particular case. 9 9 The court reasoned that had the federal government chosen to enforce the CSA not through an injunction but in the usual way, by arresting and prosecuting the defendants, the defendants would have been able to raise the medical necessity defense in the course of litigation. ' Second, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in deciding this issue without considering the public interest on the record." 0 ' The court stated that the materials the Cooperative submitted in support of its motion to modify the injunction clearly showed a strong public interest in the availability of cannabis to treat debilitating and life threatening conditions suffered by a large population of California's citizens.' 0 2 Through this evidence, the court held that the Cooperative showed that there is a class of people who could fulfill the requirements of the medical necessity exception. 0 3 By contrast, 101 Id. 102 The Court referred specifically to the fact that the City of Oakland had declared a public health emergency in response to-the district court's refusal to grant the modification before this court on appeal. Id. at 1114-15.
103 id.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW the court asserted that the Government did not identify any interest it may have in blocking the distribution of marijuana to those with medical needs, relying instead only on its general interest in the enforcement of federal statutes. The Government appealed the district court's order amending the preliminary injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the Government's request to stay the order pending appeal," 0 4 and granted certiorari to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit that medical necessity is a legally cognizable defense to violations of the CSA.' 0°I V. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion stated that the Court granted certiorari because the Ninth Circuit's decision "raise[d] significant questions as to the ability of the United States to enforce the Nation's drug laws." 10 6 The Supreme Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the CSA's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana." 7 Justice Thomas reasoned that even assuming the necessity was a recognized defense to a criminal violation, a medical necessity exception for marijuana was at odds with the unambiguous terms of the CSA.'°8 Justice Thomas began his inquiry by looking to the actual language of the CSA. He pointed out first that the Act clearly designated marijuana as a Schedule I substance, which provided for only one express exception to the prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing of marijuana: government-approved research projects. 0 9 Thomas continued that under any conception of legal necessity, the defense cannot succeed when the legislature has made a "determination of values." ' 0 In this case, he stated that the CSA's structure and its placement of marijuana in Schedule I reflected Congress's unequivocal determination that marijuana has "no currently accepted medical use" and that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception granted to other drugs under the Act. 1 " Due to what Thomas deemed "apparently absolute language" of the CSA, he summarily rejected the Cooperative's contention that because there is a necessity defense at common law, a medical necessity exception can and should be read into the CSA." 2 Justice Thomas continued by calling the general defense of necessity into question, stating that it is controversial, especially because under our constitutional system, federal crimes are defined by statute and not the common law." 3 However, he held that further inquiry into the necessity defense was not necessary in the instant case because the language of the CSA leaves "no doubt" that the medical necessity defense is unavailable. ' The second half of the decision is devoted to the Supreme Court's rejection of the Cooperative's argument that federal courts acting as courts of equity have discretion to modify an injunction based upon a weighing of public interest factors." 5 Thomas held that this argument is not a basis for affirming the Ninth Circuit, even though the district court in this case did have discretion. He argued that, while district courts do enjoy "sound discretion,"" ' 6 the mere fact that a court has discretion does not mean that it can ignore Congress's judgment expressed within the legislation." 7 Thomas asserted, however, that district courts have the discretion to choose between an injunction and other enforcement mechanisms, not whether enforcement is preferable to no enforcement." 8 Lastly, Justice Thomas held that the Ninth Circuit erred by considering the following evidence as relevant to its determination: that some people have "serious medical conditions for whom the use of cannabis is necessary in order to treat or alleviate those conditions," that these patients "will suffer serious harm if they are denied cannabis," and that there is "no legal alternative to cannabis for the effective treatment of their medical conditions."" ' Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's determination that the Cooperative had a "legally cognizable" medical necessity defense.' 22 However, his main concern with Justice Thomas's majority opinion was the broad dicta, and the "unwarranted and unfortunate excursions" that Thomas made in his opinion, which prevented Stevens from joining the majority.' 23 Justice Stevens first clarified the majority's "narrow" and "limited" holding: "We hold that medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana."' 24 He argued that the majority's opinion reached far beyond the facts of this case by suggesting that the medical necessity defense is unavailable for anyone under the CSA.' 25 The only issue presented in this case, Stevens asserted, is whether the medical necessity defense is available to distributors of marijuana. 2 6 Stevens argued that the majority "gratuitously casts doubt" on whether necessity could ever be a defense to any federal statute that does not explicitly provide for it.' 2 ' Stevens criticized the majority's assertion that this is an "open question," and argued that Supreme Court precedent has undoubtedly established that necessity is a viable common law defense, even in cases involving federal criminal statutes that do not provide for it.' 2 8
Justice Stevens stressed the "importance of showing respect for the sovereign States" and discussed the implications of the majority's overly broad language for federalism.' 29 He argued that this is a case 120 Id. 121 Justice Ginsburg joined in Justice Stevens' concurrence. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or the decision of this case.
122 Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting OCBC, 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.
1999)).
123 Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., concurring The Supreme Court's decision in Oakland is incomplete in that it ignores the critical underlying issue that is necessary to resolve this case: whether the CSA's regulation of wholly intrastate cultivation, possession, and use of medical marijuana, sanctioned by California law, exceeds Congress's enumerated power under the Commerce Clause. The "first principles" of federalism command the Court to intervene in cases such as Oakland in which tension exists between state and federal law and in which Congress seeks to regulate wholly intrastate activities under its Commerce Clause power. 133 Furthermore, because the Court in Oakland failed to address this crucial issue, the decision is inconsistent with the Rehnquist Court's reinvigorated loyalty to federalism and to reining in Congress's commerce power. Lastly, had the Court examined the CSA under the heightened scrutiny of Lopez and Morrison, its decision should have been radically different because a heightened review of the CSA under Lopez and Morrison reveals that the Act's regulation of wholly intrastate cultivation, possession and use of state sanctioned medical marijuana exceeds Congress's commerce power.
A. THE OAKLAND DECISION IS INCOMPLETE IN ITS FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
Justice Thomas's opinion in Oakland ignores a crucial issue that is necessary to resolve this case: does Congress's attempt to regulate the wholly intrastate activity of distribution of marijuana for medical purposes under the CSA exceed the power afforded to Congress by the Commerce Clause? In Oakland, the Court held that the language and the structure of the CSA abrogate the discretion of federal courts to balance potential harms in issuing injunctions and eliminate the medical necessity defense. 34 The next logical and necessary question the Court should have addressed is whether such a broad statute, which, according to the majority, lies beyond the reach of both the federal courts and the states, exceeds Congress's enumerated commerce power. Had the Court addressed this issue, it should have found that the CSA, as it is applied to conduct related to the medical use of marijuana, is, at the very least, highly constitutionally suspect.
Federalism Principles Require an Inquiry into the Constitutionality of the CSA
In order to avoid an all-powerful central government and to ensure state sovereignty, the Constitution declares the federal government to be one of enumerated powers. 35 Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment proclaims that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 36 One of the enumerated powers granted to Congress by the Constitution is the power to "regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes," ' 37 known generally as the commerce power. Police powers, including the protection of public health, 3 ' safety, and morals of citizens, are left to the states, however. " ' 39 Nevertheless, despite its lack of a "police power," Congress health care and criminal law enforcement. 43 In enacting the CSA,
Congress claimed that it intended to allow the states to freely exercise their independent authority over public health.' Second, the medical marijuana issue in this case involves a situation in which a state has chosen to "serve as a laboratory" in the trial of a "novel social and economic experiment. ' ' 14 Thus, because of these two considerations, the paramount principles of federalism impose a duty on the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to settle and minimize the conflict between federal and state law at issue in Oakland. 141 Justice Thomas's sole explicit reference to federalism concerns is buried in a footnote, in which he asserts that, while the majority shares Justice Stevens' concern for the sovereignty of the states, the Court is not at liberty to rewrite the federal criminal code, and is also not passing on any constitutional question. See Oakland, 532 U.S. at 495 n.7. 142 See id. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring). 143 See Laguarda, supra note 138, at 160 (health care primarily left to states); Brickey, supra note 140, at 1138 (criminal law traditionally left to states). 144 See 21 U.S.C. § 903 ("No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intention on the part of Congress to occupy the field ... unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that state law so that the two cannot consistently stand together."). 145 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments .... "), quoted in Oakland, 532 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring). 146 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for [the federal judiciary] to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far."). See also Oakland, 532 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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reinvigorate federalism, and, significantly, to use federalism to limit Congress's authority.' 47 In the seminal Lopez decision, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal criminal statute for the first time in nearly sixty years for exceeding Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.' 48 The Court also indicated that it would continue to subject regulations passed by Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to a heightened, independent review.' 49 Morrison, involved a more recent Commerce Clause challenge in which the Court struck down another federal statute as unconstitutional, signaling that Lopez was not an anomaly, but is the standard by which the Rehnquist Court will evaluate Congress's Commerce Clause authority in the future. " ' Thus, based on the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence since 1995, Oakland cannot be properly settled unless the constitutionality of the CSA is analyzed thoroughly. knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."' ' 53 Lopez challenged his indictment by arguing that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the statute under which he was charged, the GFSZA. 5 4 The United States Supreme Court, by a narrow five-to-four decision, affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding that the GFSZA was unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its commerce authority by enacting it."' 5 The Court laid out three categories of activity that Congress can regulate under its commerce power: (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
156
Because the GSFZA, like the CSA, did not seek to regulate a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce, and because it sought to regulate wholly intrastate gun possession, it might only have fallen into the third category of activities.57 The Court held that the proper test to determine whether Congress can regulate wholly intrastate activities is whether such activities have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce.' 8 The GFSZA, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce because the Act "neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. ' 159 The majority distinguished this case from precedent by stating that unlike prior acts before the Court, the GFSZA "is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."' 6° The Court also distinguished the activity at issue in Lopez, gun possession, from the activity at issue in Wickard v. Filburn, 6 ' wheat production for personal use, by asserting that the latter involved a commercial activity whose intrastate effects could be aggre-"' 18 U.S.C. § 992(q)(2)(A) (1994). 114 
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SUPREME COURTREVIEW gated.' 62 The Court asserted that if it aggregated the non-economic activity of gun possession, as the Government urged it to do, it would be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' 63 Federalism is a persistent theme throughout the majority opinion of Lopez.' 64 Chief Justice Rehnquist began his Commerce Clause analysis by describing the way in which the Constitution divides the framework of the United States' government between the national government and the states, describing this framework as the "first principles."' 65 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that it is the judiciary's role to maintain the balance between federal and state power,' 66 and he argued that the GFSZA upsets the balance of power to such a degree that the judiciary must step in to render it unconstitutional.' 67 Moreover, the Chief Justice argued that to sustain the GFSZA would be to undermine any VAWA ensured the right of all persons in the United States to "be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."' 73 The constitutionality of VAWA's civil remedy provision was called into question when a female Virginia Tech student brought a federal civil suit under section 13981, alleging that two Virginia Tech football players raped her 74 The two defendants filed a successful motion to dismiss, in which they argued that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to pass section 13981 under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.' The United States then intervened on behalf of the plaintiff and appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that Congress was justified in passing section 13981 under its commerce power because gender-motivated violence substantially affected the national economy.' 76 Relying entirely on the principles in Lopez, the Fourth Circuit held that Lopez dictated that it strike down section 13981 of VAWA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power.' 77 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, quoting extensively from and delineating the principles set forth in Lopez. i 17 The Court evaluated VAWA by applying the factors it had laid out in evaluating the GFSZA in Lopez. 7 9 First, the Court began its Commerce Clause analysis by addressing the dispositive issue as to whether the activity VAWA sought to regulate was economic in nature. 8° Just as in Lopez, the Court concluded that "[g]endermotivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. ' 
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The Court also held that the legislative findings used in drafting VAWA were insufficient to demonstrate a sufficient link between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce.
3
Notably, unlike the GFSZA at issue in Lopez, the VAWA was passed with an extensive congressional record that detailed the vast effects violence against women had on various aspects of American society. 8 4 Furthermore, VAWA was passed with the overwhelming support from the vast majority of states. 185 The Court dismissed these congressional findings, however, holding that "the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause regulation."' 86
Justice Thomas's View of Federalism as Expressed in Lopez and
Morrison The Court established in Lopez that the Supreme Court would evaluate Congressional acts enacted under the Commerce Clause with an independent, heightened scrutiny in the name of the "first principles" of federalism. 192 Had the Supreme Court applied the principles it so vigorously asserted in Lopez and Morrison to Oakland, especially Justice Thomas's version of these issues, the Court would have found, at the very least, that the CSA is extremely constitutionally suspect as it is applied to marijuana grown and distributed wholly within one state, under that state's laws, for medical purposes.
an interpretation seems to be at odds with the Rehnquist Court's reinvigorated federalism ideals. Oakland, one of the only cases involving the CSA to reach the Supreme Court, served as an opportunity to apply Lopez to the CSA, to reassert the federalism concerns it stressed in Lopez, and to decide its constitutionality one way or the other.
The lower federal courts have upheld the CSA by distinguishing it from the GFSZA on three general grounds.' 96 First, lower courts have argued that unlike the GFSZA, the CSA contains specific and extensive findings as to the substantial effect single state drug activities have on interstate commerce. 97 Second, federal courts, including the district court in United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, have concluded that in contrast to gun possession, intrastate drug possession is inherently commercial.' 98 Third, courts have held that under the Wickard doctrine, Congress may regulate trivial instances of drug activity, such as possession or cultivation, because they fall within a broader "class of activities" that Congress believed to affect interstate commerce. 1 99 Taken one by one, an analysis of each of the arguments set forth by lower federal courts to uphold the CSA reveals that the Act may very well exceed Congress's enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause.
The Lopez and Morrison Decisions Established that Legislative Findings Do Not Necessarily Prove A Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
Congress claims that it can regulate the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical purposes because they fall into
